

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW

MICHAEL J. MCQUEARY

: NO. 2012-1804

VS

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ORIGINAL

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (JURY TRIAL P.M. DAY 8)

BEFORE:

THOMAS G. GAVIN, SENIOR JUDGE

SPECIALLY PRESIDING 15TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

DATE:

OCTOBER 26, 2016

PLACE:

CENTRE COUNTY COURTHOUSE ANNEX

ANNEX COURTROOM

108 SOUTH ALLEGHENY STREET

BELLEFONTE, PA 16823

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: ELLIOTT STROKOFF, ESQUIRE WILLIAM T. FLEMING, ESQUIRE

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
NANCY CONRAD, ESQUIRE
GEORGE MORRISON, ESQUIRE
KIMBERLY HAVEAR, ESQUIRE





NOTES BY:

JENNIFER AMENTLER

OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

ROOM 101, CENTRE COUNTY COURTHOUSE

BELLEFONTE, PA 16823

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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, at this time the University calls Coach Matt Rhule who was 3 unavailable to appear in person due to it being 4 5 football season. 6 THE COURT: Okay. (Whereupon, a video deposition was played.) 7 THE COURT: Members of the jury, we'll take a 8 9 break. Again, don't discuss the matter with anybody. 10 11 (Whereupon, a recess was taken.) THE COURT: Go ahead, Ms. Conrad. 12 MS. CONRAD: Permission to call Mr. Bill 13 Mahon. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MS. CONRAD: Thank you. WILLIAM MAHON 17 Was called as a witness and having been duly sworn, 18 was examined and testified as follows: 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 20 BY MS. CONRAD: 21 22 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Mahon? Α. Hello. 23 I apologize for having you to return to the 24 courtroom and we appreciate you taking the time from 25

your day and your teaching schedule. Just to refresh everyone's recollection, could you relate to us the position you held at Penn State University in November of 2011?

- A. I served as vice president for University relations.
- Q. And I'm not going to take you back through your job duties or any of your previous testimony since the jury already heard that, I'm going to just focus on some follow up questions. I believe I had asked you at that time in November of 2011, was your office monitoring the news media in terms of articles that were being published?
- A. Yes. That was routine for years in the office.
- Q. And did there come a point in time that there was increased activity with respect to the number of news articles that were being numbered by your office?
- A. Yes. In that day or two leading up to the presentment, there was a lot more attention in the press.
- Q. And how about throughout that week? Did it die down? Did it increase?
 - A. Yeah. It built during the course of the week

as many more reporters showed up in town in person 1 to cover different story angles. And did the articles that were being 3 0. published that your office were -- was monitoring, 4 did they increase during that week? 5 Absolutely. Probably the most coverage I've 6 Α. 7 ever seen for a story at Penn State. I want to direct your attention to the binder 8 marked Defendant's Exhibit Volume 1. I'm not sure 9 if that's what you have in front of you, but if you 10 could check. 11 Defendant's Exhibits Volume 3. 12 Α. We need to find Volume 1, sir. 13 Ο. Yes. 14 Α. I want to direct your attention to tab 76. 15 Ο. Yes, I have it. 16 Α. MS. CONRAD: And Your Honor, I believe that 17 -- strike that. 18 19 BY MS. CONRAD: Is tab -- is the article contained at tab 76 one of the articles that your office was monitoring 22

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in November of 2011?

I have no idea if it was exactly one of the Α. hundreds of stories that we saw each day. It's the kind of story we would have been looking for.

1	Q. And is it the kind of story that you were				
2	looking for in terms of monitoring the content that				
3	was being published by the media?				
4	A. Yeah. We would be looking for anything				
5	related to this particular case that had Penn				
6	State's name in it.				
7	MS. CONRAD: Permission to publish, sir.				
8	This article has already been admitted.				
9	MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, again				
10	THE COURT: The article was admitted as I				
11	understand it over the objection of the defense.				
12	Again, with regard to it was admitted to show what				
13	was out there, not the truth of the matter here.				
14	MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir.				
15	THE COURT: And what purpose is showing this				
16	article now?				
17	MS. CONRAD: To show what was out there in				
18	the media with respect to what the media was				
19	reporting about Mike McQueary.				
20	THE COURT: There's plenty of that in the				
21	record already.				
22	MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, this witness has not				
23	yet had the opportunity to testify as to his				
24	office's involvement with this article. We stopped				
25	at article 71 when he was previously here prior to				

your ruling.

MR. STROKOFF: And if I may, Your Honor. The problem is, he hasn't identified even one article that he said this is one that we monitored and this is one that we took action on. So --

THE COURT: Well, again, I have Exhibits 71 and 72 admitted without objection, 73 and 74 admitted over objection, 75 wasn't moved, 76 was admitted over objection. Again, the difficulty with putting these things up and saying well, it's just up for what was out there and not the truth of the matter as asserted, you got the matter that's asserted. And you can ask him what he did as a result of these articles, you're not going to be permitted to publish it.

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, may I approach?
THE COURT: Yes.

(Whereupon, the following discussion was held at sidebar:)

MS. CONRAD: Matt Rhule just testified and he made that Mr. McQueary's reputation may have been hurt by things that were being said about him in the media. Other witnesses have testified.

THE COURT: Agreed.

MS. CONRAD: And this witness is prepared and

has testified that these were the types of articles that were being monitored by his office. As a result, it is — I respectfully request the opportunity, just as Mr. Strokoff cough had the opportunity to publish the content of articles, to simply publish the headline of this article.

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor --

THE COURT: This is the opinion of someone that's writing a magazine article and you're saying what he says. So, how does that -- publishing that not -- what's the rationale for publishing the article? I'll have you explain it to me more clearly.

MS. CONRAD: The rationale for publishing it, sir, is number one, Mr. McQueary has testified that national media and public opinion ruined his reputation. Now, at least several other witnesses, including the last witness, have testified that Mr. McQueary's reputation and particularly his ability to continue in the profession of college football coaching could very well have been hurt by things said about him in the media.

THE COURT: So you can very easily say, does this article reference what it is that Mr. McQueary saw and did not do and does it criticize him of that

fact?

MR. STROKOFF: The problem I have, Your
Honor, is that he can't everyone verify that he ever
even saw this. This is something that somebody
pulled off the internet. So he's not even saying
this is what we monitored, this is what he sent up
to the central office to tell them here's what the
press is saying, we got to do something. It simply
has no relevance.

THE COURT: So if can't identify it -- ask him that question first, if he can't identify it, then on what basis does it come in?

MS. CONRAD: As Your Honor has previously ruled that news articles --

THE COURT: You have so many news articles in here it's over the top. Both sides. Both sides have so many that if this jury hasn't figured out that the news media is accusing him of not being a man, that's the argument, what should have done, this article is no different.

MS. CONRAD: I have not had the opportunity to publish this headline. And I will pick two headlines, if permitted. Mr. Strokoff has been permitted to publish contents of news articles without having a witness verify them because, based

on Your Honor's ruling, that these articles are exceptions to the hearsay rule.

THE COURT: I don't recall that. I think we went back and forth on this issue so many times that I feel like a fish flopping one way or the other.

MS. CONRAD: My recollection, sir, is you specifically told me, if you've been prejudiced, bring a witness back for that purpose after allowing Mr. Strokoff to read from a news article.

THE COURT: And you can simply ask him, was the media coverage directed to the sexual incident and Mr. McQueary's response to that incident? And that solves the problem.

MS. CONRAD: Was the media coverage related to --

THE COURT: Addressed the sexual conduct that Mr. McQueary saw and what did and did not do.

MS. CONRAD: Was the media article related to an incident that Mr. McQueary observed with Mr. Sandusky and what he -- how he responded the night -- if I could just read the headline, it would be so much easier.

MR. STROKOFF: Really, the thrust of the headline is he should be fired. That's what it says. Not all this other stuff.

MS. CONRAD: It does not go to -- he was not fired. That's not the issue in this case. He's claiming that his reputation has been injured. This article goes directly to the reputational claim that he is making. And I say for the third time, Mr. Strokoff was permitted.

THE COURT: That's the solution that I'm giving you. If I'm wrong, you have the point for appeal.

MS. CONRAD: May I see the headline? I want to be sure I raised the question without issue.

THE COURT: I recall this man talking about

New York Times articles, Washington Post articles,

and I think they were displayed to the jury and they

all essentially went down the same way. I mean, I

don't even understand why you're recalling him on

this point, but it's your witness and deal with him

as you.

MS. CONRAD: I'm recalling him, sir, because you changed your ruling with Mr. Strokoff was introducing a media article. And you told me to address it. And I believe we were directed to stop publishing at Exhibit 72. And we checked the transcript for that purpose, sir.

THE COURT: You're right. I was looking at

72, which went in without any objection.

MS. CONRAD: Does the media article contained at Exhibit 75 address Mr. McQueary's actions on the night he saw Jerry Sandusky in the shower with a young child?

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, may I get my exhibit list? I have notes on mine as well.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MS. CONRAD: And if I might add, you may recall that Mr. Strokoff was permitted to read from a news article, and it wasn't even text from the news article, it was a comment that was posted in response to the article. And he was permitted to read the entire text messages.

THE COURT: Which exhibit was that?

MR. STROKOFF: That was 91, Your Honor. That was a time stamped comment somebody made to a newspaper article at 6:00 a.m. saying that the graduate assistant is Mike McQueary.

THE COURT: You're telling me you established when in point of time someone from the chain of command would know it was Mr. McQueary?

MR. STROKOFF: Well, I put in a number, yes.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. STROKOFF: It was just the time stamp.

MS. CONRAD: He was permitted to put in a number of them and read from the articles.

MR. STROKOFF: They weren't published.

THE COURT: Give me my 76 back. That's the resolution. You have the right -- you have an exception. You can put on a record later each of the exhibits that you wanted to have the witness address and publish to the jury so it's all preserved.

MS. CONRAD: Then am I permitted to ask the questions as Your Honor has directed with respect to these articles that were not previously --

THE COURT: I'm saying that you can ask him, among the articles you were monitoring, your office was monitoring were there articles along the lines of the gist of what he just said.

MS. CONRAD: Okay. And you want me to do that one time, sir?

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Strokoff has already objected that this man can't say, and I doubt that he will say, that he ever even saw this article. So I think I'm going a little further for you by allowing you to get it in. Because if we go to each article individually and he says no, no, no,

then you don't get to question anymore. So it's 1 your call. MS. CONRAD: I will ask the single question, 3 sir, based on your direction. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. 5 (End of sidebar.) 6 BY MS. CONRAD: 7 Mr. Mahon, the media articles contained at 8 tab 76, I believe you're there? 9 Α. Yes. 1.0 Is that media article -- does that media 11 article that your office was monitoring address Mr. 12 McQueary's actions on the night he saw Jerry 13 Sandusky in the shower with a young child? 14 I haven't read this article. Α. 15 I understood. But if you look at the first 0. 16 -- at the headline. 17 Yes. Ά. 18 Having looked at the headline of this 19 article, without reading it, does this headline 2.0 address Mr. McQueary's actions on the night he saw 21 Jerry Sandusky in the shower with a young child? 22 Α. Yes, it does. 23 Thank you. I have no further 24 MS. CONRAD: questions. 25

MR. STROKOFF: No questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. You can go back to whatever you were doing.

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, at this time we request permission to load the second video.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. CONRAD: Thank you, sir.

Your Honor, at this time, permission to show the video deposition of Coach Bill O'Brien who was not available to appear in person because it is football season.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

(Whereupon, a video deposition was played.)

MS. CONRAD: At this time, the University rests.

THE COURT: Okay. Members of the jury, you have now heard all of the testimony in the case.

Tomorrow morning we will have the closing arguments and the charge of the Court. When you arrive tomorrow, just procedurally, I think they're going to have menus for you so we don't have to have chili and peppermint patties for lunch, you're going to get something else for lunch.

My thinking is that if the timeline stays as I envision it, and we all know it doesn't work that

way all the time, but if it does, that the attorneys would close, I would charge, you would go out to deliberate and the lunches would be there. And I would suggest, if that timeline holds true, you just have a relaxing lunch and then when you're finished with lunch, you begin your deliberations and you take whatever amount of time is necessary.

So at this point in time the only thing each of you individually should have decided is who and what you believe of the testimony that you've heard. You're not clearly in a position to decide anything because you have to hear the arguments of the attorneys and the instructions of the Court. And then you're going to have to go in there and arrive at a collective decision. It's not an individual decision, you have to agree collectively, and I'll tell you all about that tomorrow.

So having said all of that, have a safe trip home, we'll see you here tomorrow morning ready to go.

(Whereupon, the jury was excused for an overnight recess.)

THE COURT: There's a couple items of housekeeping that I want to make sure that are taken care of before I forget it. And the two videos, I

take it we've got copies that are marked and going to be introduced because the reporter wasn't taking them.

MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir. Do you want the transcript?

THE COURT: Well, how do we know what was read? I mean, we have the video of Rhule. Is there a written transcript where you folks went through and you designated what pages were being done?

MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: I mean, it will be easier for me to have the transcripts that way. And while I'm saying that, that's all part in parcel of the whistle blower claim because I'm assuming that everyone would prefer to have findings of facts and conclusions of law written. And the rule says I should do that within seven days, and I can tell you I have been trying at night to keep up with the day before's making findings, et cetera, and there's no way in a realistic sense that I can review all of the notes of testimony and everything and have a cogent decision within seven days. If you want one off the top of my head, great. If you want a reasoned decision, then we're going to have to wait.

I'm not going to delay you, but I'll tell you

the real world in which I work, I'm supposed to go to North Carolina next week to my brother-in-law's for a couple days, not the whole week. After that, I go back to my own county to deal with the grand jury and my own people for two weeks. But that does not prevent me from working at night at home. So I would anticipate that I would have reread everything and been making my findings and probably have them not the end of next week but probably by the middle of the following week.

Now at one point in time, Ms. Conrad, you indicated that you wanted to have proposed findings or to have some argument before we made any decision. I'm willing to accept anything that you want to submit. I think the law side is going to be more helpful than the fact side, but I don't want to preclude either side from what it is that you'd like to do. So maybe we think about that tonight and you can tell me tomorrow what your pleasure is in that area.

Second thing, when I went upstairs today to my home away from home, I was expecting a packet of documents from my own county, and they were there.

On top of it was a letter from a Mary Shirey,

S-H-I-R-E-Y, which I opened. And as soon as I

opened it, I could see that both of you were copied. And then I saw that she was beginning to comment about the whistle blower case. I immediately folded up the letter, stuck it back in the envelope, and did not read the letter. You two folks are going to have a copy of whatever she said to me. But I'm just telling you that as soon as I realized she was addressing the matter, I folded the letter up and put it back and I have not read it, and I have no intention of reading it. But we'll mark it as a court exhibit and just keep it with the file, but I wanted you to be aware that that occurred.

MR. STROKOFF: Her name again, Your Honor? Mary Shirey?

THE COURT: Yes. I think both of you, when I took a quick look at it, I saw at the bottom that both of you were copied in.

MR. STROKOFF: My office has gotten a number of communications since the trial started.

THE COURT: So thankfully, this is the only one I got and I didn't read it and I have no intentions of reading it. It has no bearing on my decision in the matter.

Okay. Now, the other thing is when you read the stipulation in the other day with regard to

Curley and Schultz, as you were reading it, Mr. Strokoff, it didn't seem to sync up exactly with what was written. And I don't know because there were various permutations of the document whether I had the most recent one in front of me.

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MR. STROKOFF: The one we handed up was signed, Your Honor, and I think it was dated Tuesday, I can go dig it out. But it was signed by both Ms. Conrad and I and dated.

THE COURT: Okay. So what exhibit was it turning out to be because I have stipulation that was a draft and then I have a stipulation without signatures?

MR. STROKOFF: This is it. It's signed and dated on the second page, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. STROKOFF: But I didn't label it as an exhibit.

THE COURT: Well, what I had, as you were reading, on the copy that I had, that I didn't have the signed one, I made a note that you began to add some language that wasn't in the copy I had. But it is in this one. So you didn't do anything you weren't supposed to do, you just threw me off when I was looking at the document saying wait a minute,

it's not what I have in front of me.

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Okay. So, the stipulation has not been marked as an exhibit; correct?

MR. STROKOFF: That's true.

THE COURT: Okay. So we're just going to mark it as Court Exhibit Number 2 and then that way we got the stipulation covered. So I can tear this one up.

Let's talk just briefly about exhibits. is your feel as to exhibits that you would like to see go out initially or is it your preference we wait until they ask for things? It seems to me the Spanier letter ought to go out, although they've had so many opportunities to write it down word for word, if they don't have it I don't know that giving it to them is going to be any advantage. The rest of it, I have no idea where to begin as to what it is that logic says would help them in their decisionmaking process. So I think I'm okay with giving them Spanier and then beyond that, I'll hear you. I'll hear you whether you want them to have Spanier or not and then anything else you think they might want before we tell them you can ask and then we'll decide.

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, my preference would

be to wait and see if they ask. To send just the Spanier statement is to highlight that exhibit, and I would prefer that we would have the opportunity to see more than one exhibit as opposed to just sending one exhibit.

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, there are a number of exhibits we think the jury ought to have. One is the Schultz handwritten note of 2/12/01, I believe it's Plaintiff 7, where he specifies the plan, what they plan to do; Courtney's time sheet of the day before.

THE COURT: Just give us exhibit numbers so we can all be looking at the --

MR. STROKOFF: I'm going to need about five or eight minutes to do that.

THE COURT: Okay. So you need some more time before you're ready?

MR. STROKOFF: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't you just take the five minutes and pull up all the exhibits that you want to go out with the jury and make sure Ms. Conrad has an opportunity to know and then we can discuss what we want to do with those. We'll give you ten minutes.

(Whereupon, a recess was taken.)

MS. CONRAD: I go back to my original preference that we wait to see what the jury wants.

THE COURT: And I'm not saying that I disagree with you, counsel, but I also know it might be helpful to us if we had the numbers up front so that if they ask for any of these, everybody will have had a moment to think about what their position is regarding that particular exhibit.

So the simple matter will be, Mr. Strokoff, we all have each other's emails, so you can email the list later to everybody. And we all have our books to strengthen our arm muscles and we'll carry them home and look at whatever it is you want. And tomorrow morning when we come in, to the extent that it's necessary to discuss anything, at least we'll have had a chance to look in advance of what you're talking about. Okay?

MR. STROKOFF: Okay, Judge.

MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay. So as I understand it, each side has had the other side's proposed points and has the opportunity to comment. I mean, it's going to be pretty straightforward. The basic instruction is the the basic instruction, and I don't think your input on that is necessary. I

mean, we're going to have to talk about expert witnesses, stipulations, depositions, admissions, things of that nature, all of which we'll cover.

And my usual practice is to cover what I think needs to be covered and then ask you at a sidebar in case I've missed something that you think I should have added and before I tell the jury I'm done with them, you can make your suggestions and if appropriate, we'll make corrections or additions to the charge.

So, the basic guts of it is really the defamation and I've already indicated that in my view, Mr. McQueary is not a public figure as of the date that all of this unfolded. Clearly, he's a public figure now, but we're looking at November of 2011. So the defamation charge will track a nonpublic figure person.

Now, I'll hear whatever you want to say on that other than, again, I think he's a public figure. So I mean, again, my intent is to give the standard charge, so it should not come as a surprise to anybody.

MS. CONRAD: Again, we would reassert our position that Mr. McQueary inserted himself into -- was inserted into the public domain and as counsel himself introduced through his article by I believe

it was November 6th, 2011, counsel introduced an exhibit that Mr. McQueary's name had been published that clearly put him into the center of that controversy. And on that basis, his involvement in that controversy being in the center of that controversy, as council has noted, his name being published, his name then being cast across the public domain puts him into the role as a limited public figure, a limited purpose public figure.

THE COURT: Okay. We understand your position and we disagree because certainly Mr. McQueary did not insert himself into the process. He got inserted for being a participant in an investigation. So we agree to disagree, you got the point pre served.

So with that understanding and understanding that it's going to be the standard charge, do you have any comment about the standard charge? Or do you want some amendments, modifications, or whatever?

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, in our proposed points for charge, which we sent in September 29th I guess it was, we basically used the standard charge but we added some language with respect to the particular case, I guess beginning in the third

1 paragraph. THE COURT: Okay. So, what page are we on? It's page 10. MR. STROKOFF: 3 THE COURT: Page 10. So everybody grab page 4 10 of Plaintiff's point. The third paragraph? 5 The third paragraph was 6 MR. STROKOFF: modified somewhat. And then I do believe that I 7 also made a modification on page 11. I amplified a 8 little bit, I think the standard charge says that 9 that's not necessary that the communication 10 specifically refer to the individual. And cited a 11 case, therefore. 12 THE COURT: Well, we're not going to be 13 citing any cases in the process. But I don't recall 14 15 when I read it that I had any difficulty with that. So what's the defendant's position? 16 17 MS. CONRAD: Well, first -- and Elliot, I'm 18 presuming that your changes are these highlighted 19 portions; is that correct? Your additions on page 10. 20 MR. STROKOFF: I don't have anything 21 22 highlighted on page 10. 23 Then that would be my objection MS. CONRAD:

THE COURT: Wait. I don't have anything

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starting with --

highlighted.

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MS. CONRAD: Okay. Then that would be what we would be objecting to. The statement and communication is any act by which a person or entity brings an idea to another's attention. A communication may be made by speaking or by writing words or by another act or combination of acts that result in bringing an idea to another's attention. That is so confusing and not part of the standard instruction that -- we propose we go directly to a communication is defamatory.

MR. STROKOFF: I must plead a little memory frailty here, Your Honor. But my expectation was that this language, fortunately or unfortunately, was in the standard charge.

THE COURT: That's what I got. So --

MS. CONRAD: The first paragraph?

MR. STROKOFF: Yeah. And I'm not defending the standard charge.

THE COURT: I believe that language is right out of the standard charge 17.100. And again, I haven't checked it again but I believe that's the exact language of the standard charge. And so, the only addition an entity because of course we're not talking about the person in Penn State, we're

talking about an entity.

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So, again, we're going to read the standard charge. We will, of course, make certain that we have the exact language. I don't have the standard charge in front of me, but I took that from what I understood to be the standard charge. So we will be reading the standard charge and everybody will have had the opportunity overnight to go look at the standard charge and make sure we're on the same page.

So if that's your objection as to that paragraph, again, it's the Court's belief that the plaintiff's point at page 10, number nine, first paragraph accurately states the standard charge and that's what we would read. So what else in that language do you want to address?

MS. CONRAD: Statement, a communication that implies a person has committed a crime is defamatory. I don't believe that's in the standard charge.

THE COURT: Okay. Again, where are we in the statement?

MS. CONRAD: The second paragraph, last line in section nine. That statement, sir --

THE COURT: That's an option -- and again,

the standard charge, that's an option. 1 MS. CONRAD: It would be our position that that statement implies a legal -- or draws a legal 3 conclusion. We proposed that a statement is capable 4 of defamatory meaning if it implied that the 5 plaintiff committed a crime. 6 7 THE COURT: Which page of your instructions are you looking at, counsel? 8 MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, I believe we 9 submitted to you an instruction at number 30 through 10 38. 11 THE COURT: 30 to 38, okay. I'm there at 30. 12 MS. CONRAD: What we conveyed to you was our 13 objection to their -- to Plaintiff's proposal. We 14 15 did that in a letter to you. THE COURT: I have your letter. 16 17 MS. CONRAD: We have it -- we could print it for you, sir, we have it on the laptop here. 18 19 MR. STROKOFF: What page on the letter, 20 Nancy? Looks like page three if she's 21 THE COURT: 22 talking pages. 23 MS. CONRAD: Last paragraph of the bottom of 24 the letter. THE COURT: Page three. Well, as I say, that 25

is an option under defamatory. And you're suggesting that if a person -- if the language infers that a person has committed a crime that that is not, per se, defamatory, that you're --

MS. CONRAD: I'm saying that is a legal conclusion, sir.

MR. STROKOFF: I thought that's what the instructions to the jury were.

THE COURT: Right. If they find that the language suggests that Mr. McQueary committed perjury, the commission of perjury is a crime. And if they find that the statement, in fact, suggested that he had committed a crime, that is, per se, defamatory. I don't understand your position.

MS. CONRAD: That is a conclusion, though.

THE COURT: If that's your position that it states conclusion, we're going to go with the standard instruction. I understand your position.

THE COURT: What else with regard to the --

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, could we just revisit that one more time? Could we say a communication that implies a person has committed a crime is capable of being — having a defamatory meaning, as opposed to is defamatory.

THE COURT: Because if you say I committed a

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crime and somebody believes that you said I committed a crime, you defame me if I haven't committed the crime. So I'm going to tell the jury that look, in this case they have to find that Dr. Spanier's article applies, first of all, to Mr. McQueary; and that when they read it, they have to understand that the message was whether stated implicitly or explicitly that Mr. McQueary was not truthful before the grand jury; that, in fact, Mr. McQueary is the one who was committing perjury before the grand jury.

If they find that, in fact, Mr. McQueary was truthful and if they find that that article suggested that he was not truthful and therefore, committed perjury, that that, in fact, is defamatory per se because they accused — the article has accused him of committing a crime. I don't know of any other way to get around it.

MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Another issue -- I mean, there's no issue about the publication, it's -- the defamatory argument is simple. You're going to say not anybody on the face of the earth could have figured out he was Mike McQueary that they're talking about. And he's going to say everybody on

the face of the earth could figure it out. And depending on how the jury of 12 figures it out, we're going to have a verdict one way or the other.

MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Okay? So we okay on the defamation?

MS. CONRAD: In addition, we suggested that several instructions be added, and it may be in your standard, that Plaintiff, in his instructions, failed to state that the burden, it is the plaintiff's burden in proving defamation.

THE COURT: I will make very clear who has the burden of proof.

MS. CONRAD: That the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that the communication was with that -- no, strike that. The plaintiff does not include an instruction regarding the expression of opinion.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's take it one at a time. You and your sidekick were nodding heads in disagreement with each other, so I'm not certain what your position was with regard to the comment before the opinion. So give me some help as to what page we're on.

MS. CONRAD: I mistakenly added the burden

for the public figure. So I'm withdrawing that comment.

THE COURT: Fine. So then, of course -- so you want an instruction that if the jury concludes that this is his expression of opinion only, that it's not capable of the defamatory meaning? Is that essentially what you're asking what -- where's the instruction?

MS. CONRAD: It's Defendant's instruction number 34 as well as a suggested jury instruction at number 17.150.

THE COURT: Just a sec. One at a time. So the problem becomes, and this, again, has been, at least in my mind, the focus of where we're at because you want to read the sentence, and I can't quote it exactly, that Dr. Spanier says in my opinion at the end of the day, you know, all of this will be done and, you know, the findings of the grand jury are not correct. And the plaintiff's position is look, anybody who reads that is going to be focusing on the language, you know, that the findings of the grand jury are a bunch of lull.

MS. CONRAD: The statement doesn't refer to the findings of the grand jury.

THE COURT: No. But it says --

MS. CONRAD: That --

MR. STROKOFF: I am confident that the record will show.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. STROKOFF: And, Your Honor, to some extent, I have to agree that with respect to a pure expression of opinion is protected, however, an expression of opinion that implies that there are undisclosed facts is not protected. And there's a lot of precedent on that. And a number of witnesses testified they didn't know on what basis. There's a number of University employees, they didn't know on what basis Dr. Spanier — they didn't know what basis that statement was based. And that's why I don't think that the expression of opinion, a charge is warranted.

And in particular, there was a United States Supreme Court case quite some time ago, Milkovich, where the United States Supreme Court weighed in and said that the connotation that the petitioner committed perjury sufficiently factual to be susceptible to being proved to be false and therefore is actionable. So that's why I think that the expression of opinion defense just isn't really applicable here because he didn't set forth -- the

reason why I think they're going to be found these —— charges are going to be groundless at the end of the day is because of A, B, C, D, E. He said —— and he did say I've known these guys for a long time and they're honorable guys and I'm confident, but he didn't say what the other basis was.

MS. CONRAD: He clearly testified that it was his opinion. Every University employee that testified, almost everyone, I haven't gone back and checked the record testified that they viewed it as an opinion, as an expression of opinion by Dr. Spanier which was based upon his 16 years of working with Mr. Curley and Schultz.

MR. STROKOFF: And Dr. Spanier also testified that what he didn't disclose in his statement was that he was relying upon what they told him in that brief heads up in February 12th or something like that, 2001. That's the undisclosed fact. There's some other undisclosed facts that he didn't disclose also. But that's why I don't think that that expression of opinion standard charge is applicable.

THE COURT: Well, we'll let you know tomorrow morning. I suggest you be in by 8:15 so we can tell you exactly what we're seeing on that point.

MR. STROKOFF: You said 8:15, Your Honor?

THE COURT: 8:15. What else, counsel?

MR. STROKOFF: The big one is adverse interest, Your Honor.

MS. CONRAD: There's still more with respect to defamation if we want to keep proceeding.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm asking.

MS. CONRAD: I didn't know if Elliott was jumping in.

MR. STROKOFF: I'm sorry.

MS. CONRAD: We proposed -- moving on to University instruction 37, truth as a defense. We would request that the complete instruction be given.

going to and what evidence did the University present that the statement was more likely true than not? Because the point you've given me, an essential element of defamation is the statement published was false consequently. If the statement was, in fact, true there could be no defamation regardless of the University's motivations. The University has the burden to prove that the statement was more likely true than not. And how do we prove that on the facts of the case that exist?

Dr. Spanier says I know these guys, they're great

guys and I have complete confidence in them. And we know that they've already survived multiple trips to the appellate court, and that I'm assuming some date has been scheduled for the trial on the very issue that is before this Court. So I don't know how you would get that instruction given the correct factual setting of the cases.

MS. CONRAD: Because, Your Honor, the statement does not say that the charges are groundless. It states his opinion that the record will show that the charges are groundless.

THE COURT: Okay. So you have the burden of proving that statement and how did you go about doing that in this case?

MS. CONRAD: By Dr. Spanier testifying that he based that opinion that the record in the future will show that the charges are ground less based on having worked with them the past 16 years which includes the time period in question.

THE COURT: No. Because the problem with that construct is that Dr. Spanier never read the presentment at the time he made the statements.

General counsel never read the statement at the time that it was prepared. And frankly, it's quite surprising to me that general counsel, having spent

several years in the attorney general's office, advising to, a head of 16 counties would have so lively disregarded a presentment of the grand jury as to allow even language such as that expressed as an opinion. So no, that charge is not going to be given, or that instruction because clearly, the objective evidence at this moment is that Dr. Spanier may come to regret that he said the words that he said, but that's not for us to decide. on this record, you have not shown any evidence that the statement was more likely true than not true. So that's refused, 37. You have your exception. Anything refused, you don't have to say you have your exception.

MS. CONRAD: Thank you. Looking at the instruction with respect to damages.

THE COURT: My hearing is getting truly bad because I kept thinking that your finance guy was talking millions. It took me a long time to figure billions. And then I had to do my grade school math and figure where all the zeroes were going. But go ahead, what about the damages?

MS. CONRAD: We agree to the instruction that the plaintiff is entitled to be fairly and adequately compensated. We object to the remainder

1 of the instruction because it misstates the law and 2 draws an improper conclusion of fact as well as it 3 improperly addresses liability, which is addressed in the previous instruction. So with respect to 4 5 paragraph 10, second and third paragraph. 6 THE COURT: Okay. So we're at -- so I'm on 7 page 46, Defendant's instruction number 40, and you like the first paragraph but the second paragraph 8 9 beginning A, you object to? 10 MS. CONRAD: Sir, I'm critiquing what Plaintiff submitted. 11 THE COURT: I'm looking at -- okay. 12 going to flip over and get on the right page here. 13 14 THE COURT: Which one are we on? 15 MS. CONRAD: Instruction number 10, 16 defamation damages. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Defamation damages, okay. 18 Page 13, number 10? 19 MS. CONRAD: Correct. The second and third 20 paragraph, sir. 21 MR. STROKOFF: And Your Honor, this is not 22 the standard charge. 23 Pardon me? THE COURT: 2.4 MR. STROKOFF: This is not the standard 25 charge.

1 THE COURT: 2 Conrad. 3 charge? 4 5 THE COURT: 6 7 MR. STROKOFF: 8 9 10 11 out of the book. 12 13 MS. CONRAD: 14 15 THE COURT: 16 17 MS. CONRAD: 18 19 20 49 through 55. 21 THE COURT: 22 MR. STROKOFF:

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So let me ask you this, Ms. Do you object to the standard defamation MS. CONRAD: We included the standard charge

as proposed on damages.

Okay.

I think they've got some stuff about public officials in there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, and counsel's nodding her head again, so I take it we're going to go with the straight defamation damages nonpublic official right

That's right. We would delete that last paragraph based on your ruling.

Okay. So we're just going to give the standard. What else?

Moving onto punitive damages. And we would request the jury be charged with the proposed damages as we have cited listed at numbers

Okay. So what's your position?

The modifications, and in particularly, defining outrageous conduct to exclude conduct which is in reckless indifference to the rights of others. So I mean it says here this is a

modified -- or it says it's adapted from suggested jury instruction. I mean, I'll go with the jury instruction, the standard instructions but not modified like this when they're leaving something out.

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MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, I would raise in the first instance as to whether or not an instruction on punitive damages is warranted in this case. I would suggest that the evidence does not establish that such an instruction is warranted.

MR. STROKOFF: Totally nonplus on both of them. To lie to somebody that comes in to report a crime like this and to not do anything about it and subject my client on the basis of the misrepresentation to be accused of being part of this cover up, I certainly think is outrageous warranting punitive damages. And the same thing with respect to the communication. Tell me — when you don't read — you know, nobody read the presentment, nobody knew what the charges were, and you're saying that they're groundless?

MS. CONRAD: Saying the record will show, an expression of opinion. Moreover it wasn't that he wasn't -- there's no evidence on the record that he

wasn't told anything. Plaintiff testified to two meetings. Plaintiff testified in the first meeting, he was told that the matter was taken seriously and would be reviewed. He then testified ten days later he received a call from Mr. Curley and Mr. Curley informed him of the three actions that he took, that the University took.

THE COURT: That's true. Under the law as it existed, appropriate action by Curley and Schultz required them. And I will tell the jury, if they credit Mr. McQueary's version of what he told them, that he observed conduct of a sexual nature, that they were required by the then existing law to go ahead and report that to the police and to the appropriate Department of Public Welfare or Children and Youth Services Agency, whatever it was.

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, the evidence on the record is to the contrary. Again, Plaintiff put a witness on that testified that while he suggested it was the smart thing to do to report, it was not required. That's the evidence on the record.

MR. STROKOFF: What we're talking about I think is punitive damages. And the thing, Your Honor, and the representation was --

THE COURT: The misrepresentation is that

because Mr. McQueary thought they were going to take the appropriate action, and the appropriate action under the law was to report it, because they failed to do that, Mr. Sandusky continued to do what Mr. Sandusky was doing until the attorney general got involved and the case blew up. And Mr. McQueary is now being pointed at as the person who's failure to act would have prevented Mr. Sandusky from continuing to do what he was doing. And you, in fact, raised that because you said did he go back? Did he separate the boy? Did he do anything? that was action that Mr. McQueary, both under Penn State's policy, which was unrefuted because the medical doctor Dranov, or whatever his name he said, that his understanding of procedure was you go to your superior, he went to his superior, Paterno went to his superior, neither one of them were mandated reporters, McQueary nor Paterno, but Schultz and Curley were. And the appropriate action is that they would have reported it. So the argument is that the failure to report is what was the misrepresentation because they said they would take appropriate action and they didn't. And that's where we're at.

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MS. CONRAD: First, there is no record on the

evidence, except what Plaintiff has testified to, that there was a report of child sexual abuse. Dr. Dranov himself said there was no information received about sexual misconduct. As a result to take it to the next step and thereby create a mandated report when advice that counsel introduced in his case was that you're not required to report it.

THE COURT: Yeah. Because -- you're putting the rabbit in the hat because the attorney said I was told it was horseplay.

MS. CONRAD: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So if it's horseplay then of course it's an entirely different situation. So if the jury credits that what McQueary told Curley and Schultz was that he observed what he believed to be sexual conduct and they said we're going to take the appropriate action, that meant what I just indicated. On the other hand, when Schultz and/or Curley, I can't keep everybody straight at this point in time goes and talks to the attorney and says I'd like you check into this because I'm told that a graduate assistant is upset because he saw horseplay in the shower. Horseplay in the shower is something entirely different from bear hugging a

child when you're naked and the child is naked in the shower and making sounds that are of a sexual nature. So if, in fact, the jury determines that Mr. McQueary is credible on that, then clearly Mr. Curley and/or Mr. Schultz are not credible in what they passed on. And the advice of Mr. Courtney, or the attorney, would not have been gee, I think it would be a good idea that you do it, you don't have to. I would imagine he would be saying, if he heard what McQueary says he told them, you go to report it.

MS. CONRAD: And there it gets back to the fundamental issue with this case, without Curley and Schultz to testify as to what they were told, we don't know all of the facts.

THE COURT: Well, sure we do because, again, you're putting the rabbit in the hat. We know what Curley went and told Spanier -- or told -- yes, told Dr. Spanier because Spanier sat here and testified and this is what they told me, it's horseplay. Okay? So you've got their testimony. So they either told him that it was horseplay and you got that in front of the jury and I'm going to tell the jury if it's horseplay it's a different kennel of fish. Or they didn't tell him the truth. The truth

1 being what Mr. McQueary told them. 2 MS. CONRAD: On the record in --MR. STROKOFF: Or Dr. Spanier wasn't telling 3 the truth. 4 5 THE COURT: Or Dr. Spanier wasn't telling the 6 truth. 7 MS. CONRAD: On the record in this case, though, there is no evidence to establish that 8 9 Curley and Schultz had reasonable cause or suspicion 10 to conclude that there was child abuse. 11 THE COURT: No. MS. CONRAD: There's no evidence on the 12 record. 13 14 MR. STROKOFF: There's --15 THE COURT: Excuse me. You can take that 16 position, counsel, with all due respect. But if 17 what McQueary told them the jury determines that to be true, in light of what they knew from the earlier 18 19 incident, no. So the punitives are in. 20 MS. CONRAD: We, in addition, object to the 21 reference to the word generally as contained on paragraph -- on page 14 number 11, punitive damages. 22 So the first word in the second 23 THE COURT: 24 paragraph, generally, you're objecting to? 25 MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Fine. You don't care if the word 1 generally is said, just begin with punitive damages? 2 MR. STROKOFF: I don't think so, Your Honor. 3 MS. CONRAD: There is a reference then, still 4 trying to find it in this section, there's no legal 5 support for the proposition that the jury may 6 include the plaintiff's trouble and expense in 7 seeking to protect his interest in legal proceedings 8 and in this suit. 9 MR. STROKOFF: I know. That came out of the 10 standard instruction. 11 THE COURT: I don't know where you're at so 12 you're going to have to tell me. 13 14 MS. CONRAD: I'm locating it, sir. 15 MR. STROKOFF: Bottom of page 16, Your Honor. THE COURT: Page 16. 16 17 MS. CONRAD: Number two. 18 THE COURT: Okay. And you're telling me that 19 it's right out of the standard charge? 20 That's my recollection, Your MR. STROKOFF: 21 I do want the Court to understand that my 22 memory is not as good as it might be but that's my belief. 23 24 MS. CONRAD: But our understanding is this 25 instruction is improper because it suggests that

Plaintiff can recover attorney's fees for his 1 2 defamation claim. MR. STROKOFF: It's the standard instruction, 3 I believe. THE COURT: Okay. We'll give the standard 5 6 instruction. MS. CONRAD: And finally, on number three, 7 While we acknowledge that the University's 8 wealth is relevant to punitive damages, there ought 9 to be an instruction that the jury may not consider 10 net worth when determining compensatory damages. 11 THE COURT: Okay. So, do we have a general 12 13 damage claim in here, section? We'll cover that. 14 We'll take care of that. MS. CONRAD: Moving onto misrepresentation. 15 THE COURT: Just a second. 16 Okav. Misrepresentation, go ahead. 17 18 MS. CONRAD: The plaintiff's instruction 19 misstates the evidentiary burden for proving a claim of intentional misrepresentation. To succeed in 20 21 such a claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each element with clear and convincing 22 evidence. 23 24 I believe you're correct. And we THE COURT:

have that language in there.

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MS. CONRAD: Plaintiff's instruction also fails to define the necessary elements to establish intentional misrepresentation.

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THE COURT: We'll give it right out of the book.

MS. CONRAD: And then finally, the plaintiff's instructions confound the liability instruction for intentional misrepresentation and punitive damages. The instruction should be separate.

MR. STROKOFF: I do follow that immediately.
But I don't have a problem with it separate. That's on page 19.

MS. CONRAD: We would propose jury instruction 29 and 41, which properly layout the evidentiary standard and also defines the element of each case -- on each cause of action.

THE COURT: Okay. Again, we'll take a look at the standard and we'll play it in. I'm going to try and have everything by tomorrow morning when you come in so you can see exactly what we're doing. Try.

MS. CONRAD: And also, Your Honor, we would request that the following instruction be added to properly reflect the Pennsylvania law, Plaintiff

cannot sustain his claim for intentional 1 misrepresentation if you find that the alleged 2 3 misrepresentations by Tim Curley and Gary Schultz were concerning promises to do something in the 5 future. MR. STROKOFF: I don't think that's accurate, 6 7 Your Honor. MS. CONRAD: Shoemaker versus Commonwealth 8 Bank, 700 A Second --9 If somebody says they're going 10 MR. STROKOFF: to do something in the future and they know that 11 12 representation is false at the time they make it, that's misrepresentation. 13 The exact quote is, "A promise 14 MS. CONRAD: 15 to do something in the future is not a proper basis for a cause of action for fraud." 16 MR. STROKOFF: Yeah. But that's unless they 17 know it's not true at the time they make the 18 uttering. 19 MS. CONRAD: That's not what the case law 20 21 says. 22 So if I say to you, I've heard THE COURT: 23 what you've said to me and it's really bad and next week I'm going to go and talk to the boss about it, 24

your position would be that's not a

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misrepresentation because it's future conduct, he's going to go and take care of it next week?

MS. CONRAD: It hasn't occurred, so you can't base an intentional misrepresentation on something that has not occurred, something that relates to the future.

THE COURT: So then you could never have a misrepresentation when A tells B information that B needs to act upon. B either has to be able to act upon it immediately or if he can't react on it immediately and then has to do it the next day or whenever the future day is, that there's no justifiable reliance, there's no misrepresentation? Can't B -- I'm sure when we read the case, there's got to be some subtle nuance that we'll be able to fair it out. Okay. All right. I saw something here about adverse inference.

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, I do want you to know that in our proposed charge on misrepresentation, we cited a Supreme Court case, specifically quoting a statement of present intention. Present intention, which is false when uttered a constitute or fraudulent misrepresentation fact. So that's -- I don't know what that other case is, but that's what the Supreme Court said.

Adverse inference is on page nine, the charge Plaintiff seeks, Your Honor.

MR. STROKOFF: And that case, the case site, it says Pennsylvania Commonwealth, it should say Pennsylvania Supreme Court. I apologize. It should just say PA 2015, that's a Supreme Court decision.

THE COURT: And your position is the charge is not appropriate because of the fact that they're not A, within your control and/or B, they're exercising their Fifth Amendment right?

MS. CONRAD: And C, that they are not named defendants in this action. So we actually start with, that they are not named defendants, nor were they and they are not employees of the University. As a result, we do not control them.

THE COURT: But they're the agents whose actions, again, depending on how the evidence is found makes the defendant, University, the defendant in the case. And of course, the University can only act through its agents.

MS. CONRAD: But we have no control over them at the time of this litigation in order to tell them it is their job duty to come in and testify here.

THE COURT: But that brings us back to the argument we've been battling all along because

clearly, if Mr. McQueary only told them that it was horseplay in the showers, they have no real Fifth Amendment self-incrimination right to assert because that information required no action on their part. On the other hand, if Mr. McQueary told them I saw two naked people in the shower and I heard sexual sounds and they told the grand jury that no, no, it was horseplay, they got a problem. And the problem is that absent — conundrum they put themselves in, their testimony would be expected, that they would would come in and say no, he never told us that, my God, if he told us that, we would have done X, Y, and Z.

MS. CONRAD: Their case has not yet been tried, sir, so it is their Constitutional right to assert their Fifth Amendment rights. We have no control over them to bring them into this proceeding.

THE COURT: And we've made the record, we're four years post Sandusky, we're just beginning his PCRA. And having done criminal law for 40 plus years, it will be another four years before we get to round two of the PCRA. And unless there's an acquittal or Mr. Curley and/or Mr. Schultz, they won't be available for years to come. So the

1 reality of the situation is, it is what it is. You've got your issue preserved. And you know, we already have visited this issue. So I understand. 3 4 MS. CONRAD: My point though, sir, is in this 5 case, the adverse inference should not apply. THE COURT: Well, I'm going to give it, with 6 the understanding that if I'm wrong, we'll all be 7 back here in good old Bellefonte in a year or two 8 and see what happens. 9 10 MS. CONRAD: And sir, I just want to clarify 11 that the instruction is that you may but need not 12 conclude. 13 THE COURT: Of course. Of course. 14 MS. CONRAD: And we have a brief on the 15 issue, if we may hand up for purposes of preserving the record. 16 17 THE COURT: Sure. 18 MS. CONRAD: Thank you. I neglected to sign 19 them but I'll do so when I file them. 2.0 THE COURT: Okay. Do we need to cover 21 anything else? MS. CONRAD: I believe there's one more 22 23 thing. 24 MR. STROKOFF: Plaintiff won't be filing a 25 responsive brief.

THE COURT: Pardon me? 1 MR. STROKOFF: Plaintiff won't be filing a 2 responsive brief to this trial memo. 3 THE COURT: 4 Okay. MS. CONRAD: As cited in the RAD Services, 5 Inc. case on page four. 6 7 THE COURT: Of the memo you just handed me? MS. CONRAD: Yes, sir. Even where permissive 8 9 adverse inference may be warranted, it gets further instructions to the jury that is that the 10 University's entitled to rebut any negative 11 12 inference presented by the silence of Curley and 13 Schultz. The jury should be instructed that if a 14 plaintiff has not supplied evidence sufficient to 15 meet his burden of proof, the adverse inference 16 created by the party's failure -- or the witnesses 17 in this case failure to testify will not supply it 18 for him. THE COURT: 19 So in that case, how was the 20 negative inference rebutted? What evidence did you put forward to rebut it? 21 22 MS. CONRAD: There's no evidence to support the adverse inference. 23 24 MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, may I --25 THE COURT: If they find McQueary says what

he said and if they find that — we already know what Curley and Schultz's position is because you put it in through Dr. Spanier, the information that was passed along to Dr. Spanier in that chain of emails that shows everything. So you got your view in. And if that's the evidence you're going to rely on, that's what I'm going to tell. You know, believe McQueary, go one way. You believe the emails, the string of emails and Dr. Spanier's testimony that it was horseplay, we're going another way. I'm sure when we read that case, it's not

THE COURT: So now your sidekick is shaking her head, so I never know if she's with you, against you.

going to say what you think it says.

MS. CONRAD: I'll let her speak for herself if you want.

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, I do believe what what I think they're confusing is there is precedent which says that the adverse inference by itself is not enough to sustain a burden of proof. I think it was an unemployment compensation case. That's not what we're talking about here. There's a lot of evidence. And the adverse inference is on top of that evidence.

Right. Is that in sync with you, THE COURT: 1 counsel, or not? 2 3 MS. HAVEAR: I would disagree. I would say that there should be an instruction that the jury 4 5 not only is it a may, a permissive instruction, but 6 that we have the opportunity to rebut and that the 7 plaintiff can sustain his case based on the adverse inference. 8 THE COURT: Based solely on the adverse 9 inference? 10 11 MS. HAVEAR: Correct. 12 THE COURT: But that's not the evidence here. 13 It's not based solely on the adverse inference. mean, you have Mr. McQueary's direct testimony that 14 15 this is what happened. You have the evidence as 16 part of the record that there was an earlier 17 incident. 18 MS. HAVEAR: But the misrepresentation claim 19 is based off of --2.0 THE COURT: Pardon me? 21 MS. HAVEAR: The misrepresentation claim 22 could be solely decided by an adverse inference 23 improperly by the jury without that instruction. 24 MR. STROKOFF: If we didn't have Mr.

McQueary's testimony and we just had an adverse

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inference. But you can't say that just because it's the plaintiff's testimony that that doesn't carry --

that that's not evidence.

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THE COURT: Okay. We'll take a look at these two cases. And of course you didn't bring copies with you for the rest to look at. Okay. What else?

MS. CONRAD: I think we're concluded, sir.

THE COURT: Se you at 8:15.

MR. STROKOFF: Your Honor, you're going to give the jury some kind of guidance with respect to the whistleblower, to tell them that they're not in that, right?

THE COURT: I'm going to tell them that they're not deciding the whistleblower case.

MR. STROKOFF: In terms of -- okay.

THE COURT: I'm going to tell them that --

MR. STROKOFF: So, we shy away from that?

THE COURT: No. I'm going to tell them that as a matter of law, I have to decide the whistleblower case, they decide defamation and misrepresentation. But to properly present those two claims to them, they had to have the context of everything that was going on and they needed to hear everything that would be, technically, within the realm of the whistleblower lawsuit as context to

view the defamation count, to view the misrepresentation count. But they need not worry themselves about resolving the whistleblower, that's for the Court to decide.

MS. CONRAD: And that instruction will be after closing, sir?

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THE COURT: Yeah. Unless you want me to tell them --

MR. STROKOFF: I think on the whistleblower, Your Honor, I think it would make more sense, just on the whistleblower, to explain that before we close.

MS. CONRAD: Oh, I disagree. Before the closing?

know, one thing I always do is I write down the educational background of everybody that's on the jury and the majority of them are associate degree through advanced degree. There's only three or four who are only high school people. So they're probably going to remember hearing that, you know, there's a whistleblower and there's defamation and there's misrepresentation and why are these folks only talking about two things? What happened to the whistleblower claim? So I think it probably does

make a lot of sense to say hey, you know, you're not going to hear any argument about the whistleblower claim because we've kept you in the dark for a specific reason, you don't get to decide that claim, the Court gets to decide it. But for context purposes you need to hear the whole story, which you did, and for that reason, counsel will be limiting their arguments to the defamation and the misrepresentation claims. And they may make some reference to the factual context to put all that together. I think that does make sense. Because otherwise, somebody's going to be sitting there

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MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, then how do we make our closing to you?

saying, what are we missing and why?

THE COURT: You're going to get to make your closing to me after we've closed to the jury and we sent them out and they could go and deliberate. I would assume that you would want some time to deal with one fact finder and then deal with the other fact finder later. So I was not expecting that you were going to address it until we got the jury out of the way and deliberating, and then I was going to give you the additional courtesy if you wanted to wait to do your findings or whatever and then have

the argument at that point in time, I'm fine. 1 2 you want to argue all afternoon? That's okay by me. MS. CONRAD: I just was asking for the 3 opportunity, sir. Happy to wait on it. 4 THE COURT: So how do you want to handle the 5 whistleblower? 6 MR. STROKOFF: Can I let you know tomorrow 7 morning, Your Honor? The idea of having to submit 8 9 something in writing in a week is not --10 THE COURT: There's no requirement. MR. STROKOFF: I understand. And we did 11 submit the three or four page memo two weeks ago. 12 13 THE COURT: Right. All I'm saying is I'm 14 willing to accommodate you and do it any way you If you want to make findings and submit them, 15 go ahead. If you want argument, you can have it. 16 17 You can have it whenever. 18 MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, I would just like to know before we leave tonight whether we're including 19 20 the whistleblower claim in any portion of our 21 closing tomorrow? MR. STROKOFF: Well, not to jury. 22 23 THE COURT: Yeah, not to the jury. And to the extent you want to argue whistleblower after 24 25 you've dealt with the jury, that's fine.

MS. CONRAD: Alternatively, if we request the opportunity to submit on papers, you would find that acceptable?

THE COURT: Yes. That's fine. So both of your clients need to be in agreement that I don't have to have everything done in seven days. Because I mean, I'm into about day four of last week reading and making notes, et cetera, but I got a lot more to read. So I'll need to know that tomorrow.

MR. STROKOFF: 8:15?

THE COURT: 8:15. A lot will happen at 8:15.

MS. CONRAD: Your Honor, any special interrogatories or verdict slip going out with the jury?

THE COURT: If you want to submit a proposed verdict slip, go ahead. You know, it's pretty straightforward.

MS. CONRAD: Okay. Can we submit that tomorrow morning at 8:15, sir?

THE COURT: You can submit that at 8:15 as long as you have a copy. But I mean, you know, did the Spanier statement defame Mr. McQueary? Yes or no. And depending on that, you get to answer a damage question and then same thing with the misrepresentation. I mean, I don't see it as rocket

science and I'm not going to be going down each individual element, do you find this element, do you find that element, you know, I don't think we need to do that.

MR. STROKOFF: Is it your practice, Your Honor, to give the jury your instructions in writing?

THE COURT: No.

MR. STROKOFF: And the order of closing, you were going look into that?

THE COURT: The order of closing is she goes first and you go last.

MR. STROKOFF: Okay.

THE COURT: Okay? I have no objection to giving the jury, if they request it and if I can't explain it adequately, the written statement of the elements of defamation and misrepresentation. But I think that adds more confusion than anything else. We'll explain it to them. If they have a question when they come out and I'm still not getting through to them, then I'll think about giving them something in written form.

MR. STROKOFF: And I understand that your practice is to let them go until seven and if they don't --

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask them tomorrow, you know, how late do they want to stay. I'm told here in this county you can go to ten o'clock at night.

MR. STROKOFF: But they can go home? They're not going to --

THE COURT: No, they'll go right home. They're not being sequestered.

THE COURT: So no. But I will ask them if they could stay as late as they can, as they want. You know, there comes a point in time where they're just burned out and they need a rest. So we'll see. Okay. 8:15.

END OF PROCEEDINGS

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me upon the hearing of the within matter and that this copy is a correct transcript of the same.

11/2/16

Date

Jennifer E. Amentler

Official Reporter

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that a copy of this transcript was furnished and made available to counsel of record for the parties, advising they had until November 2, 2016, in which to file any objections or exceptions to the same. That time period having elapsed without recording of objections or exceptions, the transcript is therefore lodged with the Court for further action.

11/2/16

Date

Jennifer E. Amentler

Official Reporter

ACCEPTANCE BY COURT Upon counsel's opportunity to review and to offer objections to the record, the foregoing record of proceedings is hereby accepted and directed to be filed. 11-1-16 Date Thomas G. Gavin Senior Judge Specially Presiding 15th Judicial District

Pittsburgh, PA 15237-2215 204 Schars Lane Mary M. Shirey

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Centre County Court Douce. The Homselve Thomas H. Gavin

Lelegante PA 16823

COURT'S EXHIBIT

204 Schars Lane Pittsburgh, PA 15237-2215 October, 22, 2016

Honorable Thomas G.Gavin Centre County Court House 102 South Allegheny Street Bellefonte, PA 16823

Dear Judge Gavin:

As a Penn State grad and concerned citizen, I am writing on behalf of Mike McQueary. When Penn State did not renew his contract, I was incredulous. He should have been complimented for reporting to three superiors what he had witnessed in the team shower, rather than ignored and, ultimately, criticized.

Sandusky's actions were outrageous and appalling (even molesting an adopted son), and, in hindsight, one should give McCreary credit for making it possible to discover the truth.

When a so-called whistle-blower reveals very important information, should that person have to defend his actions? I strongly recommend awarding McQueary lost wages. Attorney Nancy Conrad's stance that he is exploiting the tragedy for his own personal gain is totally without substance.

To second guess someone who reports the witnessing 0f sexual abuse is impossible to understand - especially when a notorious pedophile is finally - finally revealed. The latest development certainly doesn't make me proud of Penn State - when, once again, the actions are unjustified.

Sincerely,

Mary M. Shirey - mmspsc53@verizon.net (412) 364-5717

Copies: Elliot Strokoff, Esq. and Nancy Conrad, Esq.

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

MICHAEL J. MCQUEARY,
Plaintiff

Docket No. 2012-1804

٧.

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY,

(Judge Gavin)

Defendant

Stipulation

It is hereby stipulated and agreed that if Gary C. Schultz and/or Timothy M. Curley were called to testify at the trial of this matter and asked questions about any of the allegations made by the Plaintiff, or Plaintiff's testimony, or asked to identify certain documents appended to the depositions which they provided in this case, or any of the defenses asserted by Defendant, including information they received from Plaintiff and their responses thereto, that each would refuse to answer all such questions on the basis of their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Therefore, they will not be testifying in this case.



Respectfully submitted,

STROKOFF & COWDEN, P.C.

Ву:

Elliot A. Strokoff I.D. No. 16677 132 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 (717) 233-5353

WHITE AND WILLIAM

Ву:_

Nancy Conradi Esq. 3701 Corporate Parkway, Suite 300

Center Valley, PA 18034

DATE: 10/<u>25</u>/16